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Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 2.5 (commencing with § 1141.10)
(new).
SB 983 (Moscone); STATS 1975, Ch 1006
(Effective July 1, 1976)
Chapter 2.5 (commencing with §1141.10) has been added to the
Code of Civil Procedure by Chapter 1006 to mandate the implemen-
tation of a uniform system of arbitration in certain civil cases, to become
effective July 1, 1976. This procedure will provide an alternative
method of adjudicating claims filed in superior court. Specifically, Sec-
tion 1141.10 permits claims to be submitted to arbitration in those in-
stances where either all parties voluntarily agree to submit the claim to
arbitration or where the plaintiff files an election and stipulates that the
amount of the award will not exceed $7,500, thus triggering a form of
mandatory arbitration. In addition, Section 1141.10 further authorizes
the Judicial Council to establish the rules governing such an arbitration
scheme. Finally, Section 1141.20 has been added to the Code of Civil
Procedure by Chapter 1006 to permit the arbitrators to recover reason-
able compensation for their services.
COMMENT
The judicial system has faced an ever increasing problem of court con-
gestion occasioned by the dramatic growth of claims filed (especially in
superior court) during the 1960's [JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27, 37
(1973)]. A system of both voluntary and mandatory arbitration was
adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, Chapter
1 (commencing with §1), Chapter 2 (commencing with §21) (Purdon
1963)] as one method of alleviating this problem, and this system has
apparently been effective in permanently removing minor claims from
the court calendars of that state [Comment, Compulsory Arbitration to
Relieve Trial Calendar Congestion, 8 STAN. L. REv. 410, 418 (1956)].
Chapter 1006 has been enacted by the California Legislature to provide
for both the voluntary and mandatory arbitration of claims filed in su-
perior courts. The mandatory arbitration provision, however, may be
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subject to constitutional challenge under Article 1, Section 16 of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution, which contains a provision guaranteeing the right
to a jury trial in civil litigation. Thus, the enactment of a statute desig-
nating mandatory arbitration as the final procedure for the adjudication
of a claim would probably be unconstitutional [Id. at 413]. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, in Application of Smith [381 Pa. 223, 112
A.2d 625 (1955)], considered the constitutionality of their mandatory
arbitration statute in light of the right to a jury trial in civil litigation
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution [PA. CONST. ANN. art. 1,
§6 (Pardon, Supp. 1974)] and held that there was no denial of the
right to trial by jury if the statute preserves such right on an appeal from
an arbitration board's decision [381 Pa. 223, 230, 112 A.2d 625, 629].
Thus, the California mandatory arbitration scheme enacted by Chapter
1006 could apparently also withstand constitutional challenge if the
right to a jury trial is retained on an appeal from an arbitration board's
decision.
Civil Procedure; jury instructions
Code of Civil Procedure §612.5 (new).
AB 439 (McAlister); STATS 1975, Ch 461
Support: California Law Revision Commission
Section 612 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the jury in a civil
case to take all papers, evidence, and exhibits (other than depositions)
into the jury room if the court feels such documents will properly aid
the jury in its deliberations. However, the practice of taking written jury
instructions into the jury room had been deemed improper by the courts,
and was held to provide grounds for reversal [Granone v. County of
Los Angeles, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 658, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34, 53 (1965)].
Section 612.5 has been added by Chapter 461 to allow the jury, in the
discretion of the court, to take a copy of the written instructions into
the jury room.
Penal Code Section 1137 allows written instructions to be used by
the jury during deliberations and thus a major distinction had existed
between criminal and civil trials. A study conducted by the California
Law Revision Commission found no rational basis for this distinction
and recommended that the jury in a civil case also be provided a copy
of the instructions for use during deliberations [Recommendation and
Stud); Relating to Taking Instructions to the Jury Room, 1 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES C-l, C-
13 (1955-57)]. The instructions given to the jury are intended to
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guide their deliberation, and giving the jury a copy of the instructions
for reference would seem to promote greater understanding and con-
sistency in application of the law [Cunningham, Should Instructions Go
Into the Jury Room?, 33 CAL. S.B.J. 278, 289 (1958)].
In 1971, Section 612.5 was enacted [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1571, §§1,
2, at 3150] to adopt the California Law Revision Commission's rec-
ommendations; however, a provision was included in the section that re-
sulted in its automatic repeal on December 31, 1974. Section 612.5
has been added by Chapter 461 to again allow the jury, at the discretion
of the court, to take written instructions into the jury room for use dur-
ing deliberations in civil trials. Since the court is not required to give
the jury a copy of the instructions, -the impact of this section is ques-
tionable, although giving a written copy of the instructions to the jury
no longer constitutes grounds for reversal.
Civil Procedure; out of court views
Code of Civil Procedure §610 (repealed); §651 (new); §632
(amended).
SB 294 (Stevens); STATS 1975, Ch 301
Support: California Law Revision Commission; State Bar of Califor-
nia
Section 651 has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure to for-
malize the procedure for out-of-court views of relevant evidence made
by the trier of fact which cannot conveniently be brought to the court-
room. Formerly Section 610 provided the basis for such views by de-
lineating a very general guideline for their use during trial. The object
of a view was narrowly limited to the property which constituted the sub-
ject of the litigation or the place where any material fact occurred. Sec-
tion 610 did not expressly provide for the judge, as the trier of fact,
to participate in out-of-court views, nor did it expressly require the judge
to accompany the jury to the site of the view, although Section 610 had
been interpreted to allow an out-of-court view by the judge, as the trier
of fact [Noble v. Kertz & Sons etc. Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 153, 158, 164
P.2d 257, 260 (1945)]. Consent to an out-of-court view by all parties
was required, however, before the knowledge of facts gained by the
judge at the view could be considered as independent evidence on which
a finding could be made and sustained [Noble v. Kertz & Sons etc. Co.,
72 Cal. App. 2d 153, 159, 164 P.2d 257, 260 (1945)]. Although
knowledge of facts gained by a jury from an out-of-court view consti-
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tuted independent evidence, the absence of the judge was usually not
considered reversible error unless there was a clear showing of prejudice
[Rau v. Redwood City Woman's Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 245 P.2d
12 (1952)]. Furthermore, Section 610 did not require a record to be
made of the view. In absence of such a record, the knowledge of facts
gained at the view was presumed on appeal to be in support of the find-
ings, provided there was not substantial evidence to the contrary [Peck-
with v. Lavezzola, 50 Cal. App. 2d 211, 122 P.2d 678 (1942)].
Section 651 now codifies the judicial interpretation of Section 610 and
standardizes the procedure for implementation of out-of-court views.
The court, on its own motion or motion of a party, may determine that
a view is proper and order one to be made, with knowledge of any facts
gained at a view constituting independent evidence even without the con-
sent of all the parties. The presence of the entire court, including judge,
jury, court reporter, and any necessary officers, is required at the view,
and a record of the proceeding is to be made to the same extent as would
be made in the courtroom. Testimony of witnesses is now expressly al-
lowed. Section 651 also expands the proper object of an out-of-court
view to include, in addition to the place where any material fact occurred
and the property constituting the subject of the litigation, relevant ob-
jects, demonstrations, and experiments which cannot conveniently be
viewed in the courtroom.
Section 632, as amended, requires a statement by the court as to
which findings are supported primarily by evidence gained at the view,
either in its announcement of intended decision or in its findings (if
findings are requested). Additionally, the court must state which obser-
vations at the view support the indicated findings. On appeal, the court
then has a record of the proceeding and can determine for itself whether
the evidence gained at the view supports the decision or findings.
COMMENT
Section 651 allows the judge to make an out-of-court view without
the consent of all parties and to have the knowledge of facts gained con-
sidered as independent evidence. Furthermore, Section 651 does not
expressly require the presence of the parties or their counsel at the view.
In Noble v. Kerz & Sons etc. Co. [72 Cal. App. 2d 153, 164 P.2d 257
(1945) ], the court ruled that to allow a trial judge to take evidence out-
side of court without both the presence and consent of the parties
amounts to a denial of due process as well as a denial of a fair and im-
partial trial to the litigants. Therefore it would seem that either legisla-
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five clarification or judicial interpretation will be required to save these
new provisions from possible constitutional infirmity.
See Generally:
1) WITmN, CALIFORNIA EvIDENcE, Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific Evi-
dence § §643-645 (2d ed. 1966) (view of the scene).
2) Recommendation Relating to View by Trier of Fact in a Civil Cdse, 12 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 588-98 (1974).
3) Leavitt, The Jury at Work, 13 HASINGS LJ. 415, 425, 428 (1961-62).
Civil Procedure; jury service
Code of Civil Procedure §§200, 201, 202 (repealed); §200 (new);
§§199, 201a, 601, 602 (amended); Penal Code §§1070, 1070.5
(amended).
AB 681 (Siegler); STATs 1975, Ch 593
Support: California Trial Lawyers Association; California District
Attorneys' Association; League of Women Voters
Opposition: Judicial Council
AB 1184 (Chel); STATs 1975, Ch 469
Support: State Bar of California
Under prior law, Section 200 of the Code of Civil Procedure ex-
empted persons engaged in various occupations (including, inter alia,
doctors, attorneys, teachers, and firemen) from jury service [CAL.
STATS. 1972, c. 1337, §1, at 198]. Chapter 593 has been enacted to
completely rewrite the permissible exemption. Chapter 593 has re-
pealed and added Section 200 to eliminate the previous professional ex-
emptions and to now permit an exemption from jury service only where
such service is shown to create undue hardship on that person or on the
public. Furthermore, Section 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
,,een amended to eliminate the previous exemptions for persons who
have served on a jury for a total of 20 days within the preceding two
years, and for persons excused from jury service pursuant to Section 200
within the preceeding year. Therefore, a person may now be excused
from jury service when (1) the person does not possess the qualifications
prescribed by Section 198, (2) the person has been convicted of mal-
feasance in office or any felony, (3) the person is serving as a grand
juror in any court of the state, or (4) such service would create undue
hardship on that person or the public.
In addition, Section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been
amended by Chapter 593 to increase the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed in a civil trial from six to eight where two parties are
involved; and from eight to ten where more than two parties are in-
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volved. Furthermore, Section 1070 of the Penal Code has been
amended by Chapter 593 to increase the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed in a criminal trial involving one defendant from 20 to
26 where the offense charged is punishable by life imprisonment and
from ten to thirteen where a lesser penalty is involved. Where two or
more defendants are jointly tried, Section 1070.5 of the Penal Code re-
quires peremptory challenges to be exercised jointly. Under prior law,
five additional challenges were allotted to each defendant to be exercised
separately [CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 1312, §3, at 2300]. Section 1070.5,
as amended by Chapter 593, increases the number of such challenges
to seven.
Section 602 of the Code of Civil Procedure delineates grounds for the
exercise of a challenge for cause during a civil trial. One ground allows
disqualification of a prospective juror where such juror stands in privity
(i.e. guardian and ward, master and servant, or any relationship for
which the outcome of the pending action could have affect) with a party
to the action. Formerly, however, a prospective juror who was the par-
ent, spouse, or child of a disqualified juror could not be similarly chal-
lenged for cause even though the outcome of the action could affect such
person to the same degree as a disqualified juror [STATE BAR OF CALI-
FORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 12-2]. Section 602, as
amended by Chapter 469, now permits such prospective jurors to be
challenged for cause.
See Generally:
1) WIThIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial §§405, 423 (1963) (procedure
in ordinary trial).
2) 4 WrrKN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§107, 118 (2d ed. 1971) (selection of
trial jury).
3) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE DURING TRIAL
§§5.33-5.56 (1960) (examination and challenge of jurors).
4) STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1973 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 12-3 (increase of pe,-
emptory challenges).
Civil Procedure; interpleader
Code of Civil Procedure §386 (amended).
SB 842 (Grunsky); STATS 1975, Ch 670
Interpleader is a device which permits a stakeholder, who does not
know to which of several claimants he or she is or may be liable, to
bring those claimants into a single action and require them to litigate
their respective claims. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 670, Section
386(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure permitted interpleader in only
very narrowly defined circumstances. First, a stakeholder could initiate
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an action by filing a complaint in interpleader when two or more persons
had or may have had adverse claims regarding specific personal property
held or the performance of an obligation owed by the stakeholder. In
this instance, the plaintiff-stakeholder, upon an order for substitution
and the deposit of the subject matter in controversy into court, was dis-
charged from further liability. Thus, in order for a stakeholder to ini-
tiate an action in interpleader as a plaintiff, he or she apparently could
not claim an interest in the property or obligation [But see Note, Plead-
ing: Interpleader: 1951 Amendment to California Code of Civil Proce-
dure Section 386, 39 CAL. L. REv. 591 (1951) for a discussion regard-
ing the possible interpretation that a plaintiff-stakeholder could retain
an interest in the subject matter of the interpleader proceeding]. Sec-
ond, a defendant-stakeholder who had been notified of adverse claims
to the specific personal property or contract that was the subject matter
of the pending action against him or her, could interplead an adverse
claimant not already a party; or such defendant-stakeholder could file
a verified cross-complaint against a party to the action admitting liability
as to all or any portion of the contract or personal property. As to the
liability admitted, the defendant-stakeholder was no longer involved in
the proceeding. Thus, a defendant-stakeholder could utilize the device
of interpleader even though he or she retained an interest in the subject
matter of the action.
Section 386 has been amended by Chapter 670 to more closely con-
form the California interpleader statute to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. First, in addition to the instances where interpleader
is authorized by Section 386(a) discussed above, Section 386(b) sig-
nificantly broadens the instances where interpleader is available to both
plaintiff and defendant stakeholders. Now any person, firm, corpora-
tion, association, or other entity may initiate an action in interpleader
when claimants have or may have conflicting claims that could expose
such person or entity to double or multiple liability. Thus, the avail-
ability of interpleader is no longer limited to suits involving a contract,
specific personal property, or the performance of an obligation. Where
the stakeholder is the defendant in a pending action, he or she may, in
addition to filing a verified cross-complaint in interpleader, now institute
a separate action where the claimants will be required to interplead and
litigate their respective claims.
In addition, Section 386(b) now permits any interpleading party or
applicant to deny liability in whole or in part as to the subject matter
of the conflicting claims, thus permitting plaintiff, as well as defendant,
stakeholders to retain an interest in the subject of the interpleader action.
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Furthermore, the action of interpleader may be maintained although the
claims do not have a common origin, the claims are unliquidated and
liability has not yet attached to the party who has instituted the action
or filed the cross-complaint, or are not identical but rather are adverse
and independent of each other.
In addition, pursuant to Section 386(b), a stakeholder may join any
party, against whom claims have been made by one of the claimants,
as a defendant, or such other party may interplead by cross-complaint,
provided that the claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence.
For example, assume X negligently causes an automobile accident injur-
ing A and B. A has a $75,000 claim and B has a $50,000 claim against
X for personal injury. X is insured by Y insurance company for
$100,000. Y company institutes an action in interpleader to compel
A and B to come into court and litigate their respective claims to the
$100,000. A and B also have a claim against X for the amount in ex-
cess of the insurance policy. Thus, Y company, the stakeholder, may
join X as a defendant since A and B (claimants) have a claim against
X which arose out of the same transaction or occurrence; or X may in-
terplead into the action by filing a cross-complaint.
Section 386 previously contained no express provision authorizing a
court to issue restraining orders prohibiting parties from instituting fur-
ther proceedings that involve the rights or obligations presented by the
pending action in interpleader. However, where the court of equity first
obtains jurisdiction over the suit, the court has the inherent power to en-
join the initiation and prosecution of additional suits involving the same
issues [Dennis v. Overholtzer, 149 Cal. App. 2d 101, 105, 307 P.2d
1012, 1015 (1957)] and, in addition, Section 526 of the Code of Civil
Procedure authorizes the issuance of injunctions to prevent a multiplicity
of litigation. Section 386 has been further amended by Chapter 670
to now expressly authorize a court, after a complaint or cross complaint
in interpleader has been filed, to enter a restraining order prohibiting
any action affecting the rights and obligations of the parties to the inter-
pleader action to be instituted until further order by the court.
COMMENT
Chapter 670 has significantly enlarged the instances where inter-
pleader may be utilized by broadening the type of claims subject to this
remedy and also by removing the "disinterested stakeholder" require-
ment as to plaintiffs initiating an action in interpleader. However, vAth
the broadening of the availability of interpleader by Section 386 (b), the
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viability of Section 386(a) is questionable. Although Subdivision (b)
of Section 386 apparently supersedes Subdivision (a) in virtually every
instance, it should be noted that Subdivision (a) permits the defendant-
stakeholder the additional option of applying to the court for an order
of substitution, discharging the stakeholder from further liability. It
would appear, however, that this remedy is available only to those de-
fendant-stakeholders who come within the narrow definition of Subdivi-
sion (a) of Section 386 which permits interpleader only when a contract
or specific personal property is involved.
See Generally:
1) 3 WnxN, CALFoORN.& PROCEDURE, Pleading §§216-232 (2d ed. 1971) (inter-
pleader).
2) COmINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CAuiFoR i. CIL PRocEDur BEFoRE TRiAL,
Interpleader in California, §§1-6, 12-33 (1957) (interpleader).
3) Alexander, Abuse and Remedy: Claims in Interpleader, 44 CAL. S.B.J. 210
(1969).
4) Darling, Pleadings of Defendants in Interpleader Actions, 10 L.A. BAR BuLL. 125
(1935).
5) Hazard & Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CAL.
L. REV. 706, 749-763 (1964).
6) Comment, Interpleader, 6 STAN. L Rnv. 146 (1954).
7) STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1972 CONFERENCE RESOLuTiON 9-9.
Civil Procedure; vexatious litigants-motions
Code of Civil Procedure § §391.1, 391.6 (amended).
SB 1236 (Moscone); STATS 1975, Ch 381
Support: Bar Association of San Francisco
Pursuant to Section 391.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant
was previously permitted to make a motion, within 30 days after receipt
of summons, requesting a court order requiring the plaintiff to furnish
security on the grounds that the plaintiff was a vexatious litigant [CAL.
Civ. CODE §391] and that there was no reasonable probability that the
plaintiff would prevail in the action. Section 391.1, as amended by
Chapter 381, now permits such motion to be made at any time prior
to the entry of final judgment. In addition, Section 391.6, as amended
by Chapter 381, now provides that where a motion pursuant to Section
391.1 is filed prior to trial, the defendant is not required to plead until
ten days after the motion is denied or the required security is furnished
by the plaintiff. However, where such motion is made at trial or prior
to final judgment, the proceedings will be suspended after the motion
is denied or the security is furnished, for such time as the court deems
proper. Further, the amendments enacted by Chapter 381 will apply
to any proceeding commenced prior to or after January 1, 1976.
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See Generally:
1) 2 WrTnN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions §§204, 205 (2d ed. 1971) (vexatious
litigants).
2) 38 JouRNAL OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, SELEcrED 1963 LEOiSLAriON 660,
664 (1963).
Civil Procedure; injunctions and restraining orders
Code of Civil Procedure §527.3 (new).
SB 743 (Moscone); STATs 1975, Ch 1156
Opposition: California Conference of Employer
Associations; California Manufacturers Association
Section 527.3 has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure by
Chapter 1156 for the purpose of promoting the rights of workers and
preventing unnecessary interference by the courts in labor disputes by
delineating various activities as legal and therefore not within a court's
jurisdiction to issue either a temporary restraining order or preliminary
or permanent injunction. However, this section is to be strictly con-
strued in accordance with the existing law governing labor disputes.
The activities now declared legal are similar to those contained in Section
194(e) of Title 29 of the United States Code and include publicizing,
obtaining, or communicating information of existing facts involving a
labor dispute (including, inter alia, advertising, speaking, patrolling, or
any means not employing fraud, violence, or breach of the peace), and
peaceful assemblage to institute such acts. In addition, Chapter 1156
has incorporated the Norris-La Guardia Act's [29 U.S.C. §§101-115
(1970)] definition of "labor dispute" within Section 527.3 such that
a "labor dispute" now includes any controversy (except jurisdictional
strikes [CAL. LABOR CODE § 1118]) between persons involved in the
same industry or occupation (employers or employees or association of
employers or employees) concerning the terms or conditions of employ-
ment, or the representation of persons in regulating, fixing, maintaining,
or changing the conditions of employment. Further, as to any conflict
between this section and the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975
[CAL. LABOR CODE Part 3.5 (commencing with §1140); see REVIEW
OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION this volume at 444 (Em-
ployment Practices; agricultural labor---collective bargaining)] the Ag-
ricultural Labor Relations Act will control. Additionally, this section
is not intended to alter either the legal rights of public employees or their
employers, or parties to collective bargaining agreements [CAL. LABOR
CODE § 1126]. Finally, this section is not intended to authorize any un-
lawful conduct (including, inter alia, breach of the peace, disorderly
conduct, unlawful blocking of access and egress).
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COMMENT
In enacting Chapter 1156, the legislature recognized that the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction only upon af-
fidavit of an interested party and without notifying or giving the opposing
party an opportunity to be heard prior to its issuance, was subject to
abuse [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1156, §1, at ]. Furthermore, in United
Farm Workers v. Superior Court [ Cal. 3d , 537 P.2d 1237, 122
Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975)], the California Supreme Court recently declared
that the issuance of a temporary restraining order in matters where sub-
stantial free speech interests are at stake without requiring reasonable
attempts to notify the opposing party is unconstitutional [id. at ,537
P.2d at 1244, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 884]. The court found that the absence
of a notice requirement resulted in a lack of facts and law supporting
the opposing position and a naturally biased presentation by the moving
party which deprives the court of the diversity of perspective essential
to a just and proper decision [id. at , 537 P.2d at 1241, 122 Cal.
Rptr. at 881]. Thus, the legislature has determined that, as to certain
lawful conduct, the equity jurisdiction of the courts of California should
be restricted for the purpose of allowing workers full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and the right to engage in activities which pro-
mote or protect their interests [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1156, §1, at ].
See Generally:
1) 2 WVnIaN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §§46-51 (2nd ed. 1971)
(injunctions and restraining orders).
Civil Procedure; judgment by confession
Code of Civil Procedure § 1132 (amended).
SB 380 (Petris); STATS 1975, Ch 304
Support: Western Center on Law and Poverty
Opposition: California Association of Collectors
Section 1132 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the employment
of a confession of judgment, which consists of a written statement by
a debtor authorizing the entry of a judgment for a debt or contingent
liability without court action and in advance of any legal controversy.
Section 1133 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the confession
contain a verified statement by the defendant authorizing the entry of
a judgment for a specific sum and a concise statement of the facts out
of which the obligation arose. Section 1132 has been amended by
Chapter 304 to additionally require that an attorney representing the
defendant sign a certificate stating that he or she has examined the con-
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fession, has advised the defendant regarding the waiver of notice and
hearing, and recommended that the defendant utilize the confessed judg-
ment procedure in order for a confessed judgment to become final where
liability arises from goods purchased or services rendered primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, or where credit has been ex-
tended to purchase such goods or obtain such services. This certificate
and the verified statement executed by the defendant pursuant to Section
1133 must be filed with the clerk of the court where judgment is to be
entered.
COMMENT
The social utility and value of confessed judgments has been ques-
tioned by many states [Comment, Cognovit Revisited: Due Process and
Confession of Judgment, 24 HAST. L. R~v. 1045, 1046 (1973)]. The
basic controversy concerns the harshness of permitting a judgment to
be entered against a debtor without notice that proceedings have been
initiated [Id.]. In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. [405 U.S. 174
(1972)], the Supreme Court considered the preliminary question of
whether or not confessed judgments were in violation of the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that proce-
dural due process can be waived and that confessed judgments do not
violate due process if the debtor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waives his or her right to notice and court hearing. Thus, the present
legislation is apparently intended to provide a means of informing a con-
sumer of the effect of a confessed judgment and to thereby insure that
an individual's right to due process is not violated.
Civil Procedure; judgments-effect upon nonparties
Code of Civil Procedure § 1908 (amended).
AB 940 (Brown); STATS 1975, Ch 225
Section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that parties to
an action and their successors in interest are bound by a judgment as
to those matters directly litigated. The court in Stafford v. Russell [117
Cal. App. 2d 319, 320, 255 P.2d 872, 873 (1953)] held, using the
language contained in Section 84 of the Restatement of Judgments, that
a nonparty who controls the proceeding (individually or as a member
of a group) and has a proprietary or financial interest in the judgment
or in the determination of a question of fact or law is bound by a judg-
ment to the same extent as a party to the action. In addition, a party
to the action with notice of a nonparty's participation is equally bound
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
Civil Procedure
[Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal. 2d 209, 216, 209 P.2d 387, 393
(1949)]. Section 1908, as amended by Chapter 225, codifies these ju-
dicial holdings.
Finally, Chapter 225 establishes a procedure for determining whether
a nonparty is bound by a judgment pursuant to this section by author-
izing a party or a nonparty to file a noticed motion before the judgment
becomes final, or by bringing a separate action after judgment becomes
final.
See Generally:
1) 4 WInTIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment §§226-234 (2d ed. 1971) (effect on
parties, privies and strangers).
2) REsTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS §84 (1942).
Civil Procedure; prejudgment attachment
AB 919 (McAlister); STATS 1975, Ch 200
Support: California Law Revision Commission
Chapter 550 of the Statutes of 1972 [CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. Chapter
4 (commencing with §537)] was enacted in response to the supreme
court's ruling in Randone v. Appellate Dep't [5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d
13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971)] declaring California's prejudgment at-
tachment procedure unconstitutional [Comment, Attachment in Califor-
niat: Senate Bill 1048, The Interim Response to Randone, 4 PAC. L. J.
146 (1973)]. This interim legislation was to expire on December 31,
1975, and Chapter 1516 of the Statutes of 1974, the permanent prejudg-
ment attachment legislation, was to become operative on January 1,
1976. The permanent legislation affects many changes in the area of
prejudgment attachment including: (1) the restriction of instances in
which prejudgment attachment is authorized to only those claims based
on an unsecured contract that arise from a commercial transaction, (2)
the requirement that notice of attachment inform the defendant of his
or her rights and duties under the attachment procedure, and (3) the
restriction of temporary restraining orders to only those instances where
great or irreparable injury will result if the order is not issued [For
additional changes see 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALI-
FORN A LEGISLATION 195 (1975)]. Chapter 200 has been enacted to
postpone the expiration date of the interim legislation to December 31,
1976 and the operative date of the permanent legislation to January 1,
1977.
1) JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 13010 (1974-75 Reg. Sess.).
2) Recommendation Relating to Prejudgment Attachment, 11 CAL. LAw REvIsION
COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIEs 701-905 (1973).
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3) 4 PAC. L.J., REvmw OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 292 (1973) (pre-
judgment attachment).
4) Comment, Attachment in California: Senate Bill 1048, The Interim Response to
Randone, 4 PAC. L.J. 146 (1973).
Civil Procedure; exemptions from execution
Civil Code §4701 (amended);
Code of Civil Procedure § 690.18 (amended).
AB 593 (McAlister); STATS 1975, Ch 509
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
Opposition: California Rural Legal Assistance
Section 4701 of the Civil Code authorizes a court to order the parent
of a minor child to assign his or her wages to the person or agency des-
ignated by the court, as payment for such child's support, maintenance,
or education. Wages paid to federal government employees, however,
were formerly exempt from such court-ordered assignments on the basis
of a court opinion which held that such an assignment involved the fed-
eral government in litigation to which it has not consented, in violation
of the government's sovereign immunity [Applegate v. Applegate, 39
F. Supp. 887, 889-90 (E.D. Virginia) (1941)]. In addition, Section
690.18 of the Code of Civil Procedure formerly exempted from execu-
tion all pensions, credits, and benefits (including annuity, retirement,
disability, and death benefits) received from a federal, state or private
source.
In response to recommendations by state officials, the United States
Congress enacted the Social Services Amendment of 1974 [Pub. L. No.
93-647 (Jan. 4, 1974)] effective January 1, 1975, to specifically con-
sent to the assignment of federal government employee's wages as well
as attachment of any pension, credit, or benefit for child or spousal sup-
port [4 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 8133, 8157 (93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
1974)]. Section 4701 of the Civil Code, as amended by Chapter 509,
now authorizes the assignment of employees' wages, benefits, or return
of contributions received from a federal, state, or public source as pay-
ment for child support. In addition, Section 4701(h) delineates the
procedure for making such moneys available for child support payments.
This procedure, however, does not apply to the United States Govern-
ment. An employer served with an order of assignment must send the
employee's contributions to the clerk of the court where the order issued.
Upon receipt of such moneys, the clerk is required to send written notice
to the employee, the person entitled to receive the child support pay-
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ments, and the agency which ordered that such payments be made, that
the money is available to satisfy an order for child support. If proceed-
ings have not been initiated within 30 days, the clerk may release the
money to the employee upon his or her request. Finally, Section 690.18
of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended to allow payments
for child or spousal support to be satisfied from any pension, benefit,
or credit received from a federal, state, or public source.
Civil Procedure; garageman lien sales
Civil Code §3071.3 (new); §§3071, 3073 (amended); Vehicle
Code §22705 (amended).
AB 2044 (MacDonald); STATS 1975, Ch 1036
(Effective September 24, 1975)
A garageman holding a lien on a vehicle may conduct a lien sale if
he or she has authorization from the Department of Motor Vehicles, a
judgment on the claim out of which the lien arose, or a signed release
for the sale from the registered owners and all others known by the ga-
rageman to have an interest in the vehicle. Prior to the enactment of
Chapter 1036, no distinction based on the value of the vehicle was
drawn in the procedure to be followed in conducting a lien sale. Section
3071.3 of the Civil Code, as added by this chapter, now delineates a
different procedure to be followed in the event the garageman certifies,
under penalty of perjury, that the vehicle is worth less than $200. In-
stead of requesting departmental approval for the lien sale, the lien-
holder must, in the absence of a judgment or release, now notify all reg-
istered owners, legal owners, and interested parties that a lien sale may
be conducted by sending, via certified mail, return receipt requested, a
certificate of lien (§3071.3(c)) and a form through which the regis-
tered owner or interested party may declare opposition to the sale
(§3071.3(d)). This declaration of opposition is to be sent by the
owner to the Department of Motor Vehicles, and if the Department re-
ceives it within 20 days from the date of mailing by the lienholder, it
must notify the lienholder within ten days of receipt that no sale may
take place unless a judgment or release, as provided for in Section
3071.3(a), has been obtained. Section 3071.3 still permits a lien sale
without departmental approval where a judgment on the claim out of
which the lien arose has been obtained, or where the lienholder has ob-
tained a release of any interest in the vehicle from the registered owner.
If the lienholder fails to receive notice of the owner's objection from the
Department within 36 days of mailing the certificate of lien, he or she
Selected 1975 California Legislation
Civil Procedure
may proceed with the sale. The lien is extinguished, however, if the
lienholder fails to institute judicial action within 20 days of notice of
receipt of the declaration of opposition from the Department, has failed
to notify the Department of the lien within ten days after it has arisen
(it arises when a written statement of charges is furnished the registered
owner), or, where the provisions of Section 3071.3 are not utilized, if
no action has been initiated in court within 30 days after the lien has
arisen. Mobilehomes required to be moved by permit [CAL. VEHICLE
CODE §35790] are expressly excepted from the provisions of Section
3071.3, and therefore mobilehomes lienholders must still follow the pro-
cedure set forth in Section 3071, regardless of its value.
If the lienholder is permitted to conduct a lien sale, Section 3073 as
amended requires notice of the sale to be posted at his or her place of
business and where the vehicle is stored. Previously, notice was posted
only where the vehicle was stored. Section 3073 also previously re-
quired notice of the time and place of sale to be given to the registered
owner ten days prior to the sale where the vehicle was worth less than
$200, although the lienholder had an option of giving notice by regis-
tered mail, certified mail, or United States Post Office certificate of mail-
ing. The option of notifying by registered mail has been eliminated by
Chapter 1036, along with the requirement of notifying at least ten days
prior to the sale. Therefore it would appear that notification of the time
and place of sale can be given any time prior to the sale.
COMMENT
It is unclear whether the notice and hearing requirements of proce-
dural due process, as delineated in Adams v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles [11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974)],
are met by this legislation. Although the lienholder must send the cer-
tificate of lien and the declaration of opposition by certified mail, it is
arguable that this is inadequate notice. Since the 20 day period begins
when the certificate of lien is mailed as opposed to when received, it
is conceivable that the owners would not actually receive notice until the
20 day period had elapsed. If so, it would appear that the registered
owner would have no adequate method of preventing the sale if he or
she wishes to contest the lien. For example, if the owner were on vaca-
tion when the notice was mailed, it is possible that the sale could occur
prior to actual receipt of such notice by the owner. Furthermore, it
would seem that a potential problem might develop if the Department
fails to notify the lienholder within ten days of receiving a declaration
of opposition. If for some reason there is a delay, so that no notice
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
Civil Procedure
is received from the Department by the lienholder within 36 days, the
lienholder will be permitted to proceed with the sale, despite compliance
with the provisions of this chapter by the person wishing to contest the
lien. Thus despite a request for a hearing, the sale could occur, appar-
ently in violation of the constitutional due process provisions as they re-
late to the requirement of a hearing [CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15].
See Generally:
1) Comment, California Garagemen's Liens-Impact and Aftermath of Adams v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, 6 PAc. L.J. 98 (1975).
2) 6 PAC. L.J., REviEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEoISLATION 228 (1975)
(garageman liens).
Civil Procedure; preliminary 20-day notice
Civil Code §3097.1 (new); § §3097, 3114 (amended).
AB 390 (Bannai); STATS 1975, Ch 46
Support: Contractors State License Board; Registrar of Contractors;
California State Builders Exchange
Civil Code Section 3097 requires that a lien claimant file a written
preliminary 20-day notice prior to the recording of a mechanic's lien
or stop notice. Section 3097(f) has been amended by Chapter 46 to
revise the methods by which a preliminary 20-day notice may be served.
Previously this section authorized notice to be served by personal deliv-
ery, or by either leaving a copy of the notice at or mailing a copy to
the residence or place of business of the person to be served. Where
the address of the person to be notified was not known, Section 3097 (f)
additionally permitted service to be completed by sending a preliminary
20-day notice to the jobsite by either first-class, registered, or certified
mail. Section 3097(f), as amended by Chapter 46, no longer allows
service of a preliminary 20-day notice by mailing a copy to the jobsite.
The other methods, as enumerated above, remain as the only authorized
means by which notice may be given.
Previously, Section 3097(f) contained no provision for service of
a preliminary 20-day notice on a nonresident. As amended by Chapter
46, Section 3097(f) now permits a nonresident to be served by any
method permitted for service of a resident; and if that person cannot
be served by those methods, then notice may additionally be given by
first-class, certified, or registered mail, addressed to the construction
lender or to the original contractor. Furthermore, Section 3097(1)
has been added by Chapter 46 to require every written contract be-
tween a property owner and an original contractor to provide a space
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for the owner to enter his or her name, address, and place of business.
Copies of the contract containing the owner's name and address must
be kept available by the contractor for use by any person seeking to serve
a preliminary 20-day notice in compliance with Section 3097 (f).
Chapter 46 has also added Section 3097.1 to the Civil Code to require
proof that the preliminary 20-day notice has been served, where previ-
ously there was no such requirement. Proof of service may be obtained
by having the person to be notified sign and return an acknowledgment
form. If the acknowledgment form is not returned within 30 days of
its receipt, the person making the service may complete an affidavit
showing time, place, manner of service, and any additional facts which
show service was made in accordance with Section 3097. Section 3114
has been amended to provide that enforcement of a lien is expressly de-
pendent upon compliance with the requirement for service of notice and
proper proof of service. The additions and changes made by Chapter
46 were apparently intended to insure that actual notice be received by
an owner of real property. Having received notice, a property owner
is then in a position to take any necessary steps to protect himself or
herself from having to pay twice for the same work.
See Generally:
1) CONTINumo EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIENS AND OTHER
REMEDES §§3.8, 4.1 (1972).
Civil Procedure; banker's liens
Civil Code §3054 (amended); Financial Code §§864, 7609.5 (new).
AB 711 (Sieroty); STATS 1975, Ch 948
Under prior law, debts incurred by a customer in the course of doing
business with a bank or savings and loan association could be offset,
without court regulation or sanction, against such customer's deposit ac-
counts (including, inter alia, checking and savings accounts) maintained
with the bank by invoking the right of equitable setoff [Note, Banker's
Lien and Equitable Setoff: Constitutional and Policy Considerations for
Protecting Bank Customers, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1153 (1975)].
In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank [11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113
Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974)] the court recognized, however, that the asser-
tion of the right of setoff often resulted in inequities and damage that
could not be totally redressed [Id. at 358, 521 P.2d at 443, 113 Cal.
Rptr. at 451]. Chapter 948 has added Sections 864 and 7609.5 to the
Financial Code to provide that the right to any setoff cannot be invoked
to reduce the total balance of all deposit accounts, maintained by that
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customer at that bank or savings and loan association, or any branch
of that bank or savings and loan association, to below $1,000 as shown
by its records. Additionally, notice of the setoff must now be given to
the customer, either by personal delivery or first class mail, within one
day after its exercise. Such notice must contain (1) the customer's ac-
count number, (2) the balance of that account before and after the set-
off, (3) the identity of the debt claimed to be owed to the bank or savings
and loan association, and (4) the balance of that debt before and after
the setoff. Further, the bank or savings and loan association is required
to inform the customer that if he or she claims that the debt has been
paid, is not now owing, or the funds contained in the deposit account
are exempt pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with § 68 1) of the Code
of Civil Procedure (except Code of Civil Procedure Section 690.6) or
Civil Code Section 1257 the customer may so indicate on the response
form provided with the notice. Upon the receipt of the response form
by the bank or savings and loan association, the setoff must be reversed
and the customer's account credited. The limitations imposed by these
sections, as discussed above, do not apply to a deposit account (other
than a demand deposit account) where, pursuant to a written contract,
the bank has retained a security interest in the account as collateral for
the debt, or where the customer has given written authorization that the
account may be periodically debited as a method of the debts repayment.
Further, this section applies only to debts which mature on or after July
1, 1976.
Section 3054 of the Civil Code permits a banker to obtain a general
lien on all of a customer's property in such banker's possession, for the
balance of a debt incurred by the customer's dealing with the bank. Sec-
tion 3054 has been amended by Chapter 948 to subject the exercise of
such lien with respect to a deposit account to the limitations contained
in Section 864 of the Financial Code (discussed supra). However, the
significance of this amendment is questionable since, by judicial deci-
sion, deposit accounts cannot technically be subjected to a lien since the
bank takes title to the funds deposited in the account and by definition
it is not possible to have the title to and a lien in property reposed in
the same person [Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173,
105 P.2d 113, 121 (1940)]. Funds contained in a deposit account
are more properly the subject of an equitable setoff [Id.].
See Generally:
I ) Burke, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 33-41 (1974).
2) Comment on Recent Cases, 7 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1916) (nature of banker's
liens).
3) Comment on Cases, 11 CAL. L. REv. 111 (1923) (setoff of general deposits).
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Civil Procedure; court appearances by corporations
Code of Civil Procedure §90 (new).
AB 1514 (Arnett); STATs 1975, Ch 633
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 633, an appearance by a corpora-
tion in any court other than a small claims court had to be made through
an attorney [Paradise v. Nowlin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 897, 898, 195 P.2d
867 (1948)]. The court in Paradise v. Nowlin observed that a cor-
poration "is an artificial entity created by law and as such can neither
practice law nor appear or act in person" [Id.]. Section 90 has been
added to the Code of Civil Procedure by Chapter 633 to now provide
that an officer, director, or an employee of a corporation, whether or
not he or she is an attorney, may appear for a corporation in municipal
court, as well as in small claims court. Since a municipal court has orig-
inal jurisdiction over any case in which the demand or value of the prop-
erty in controversy is $5,000 or less [CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §89], re-
quiring a corporation to retain the services of an attorney to defend an
action in municipal court could easily result in attorney's fees in excess
of the amount of the claim. Therefore, by making such an appearance
in municipal court through an officer, director, or an employee, a cor-
poration may -now avoid costly attorney's fees, and may thereby afford
to defend such cases.
Civil Procedure; small claims court
Code of Civil Procedure §§1171, 11711 (repealed); §§117b, 117g,
ll7ha, 117j, 916 (amended).
AB 488 (Chappie); STATS 1975, Ch 1228
SB 212 (Mills); STATS 1975, Ch 266
SB 1072 (Cusanovich); STATS 1975, Ch 990
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1228, the subject matter of a claim
filed in small claims court did not have to be disclosed in the complaint.
Section 117b of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Chapter
1228, now requires such disclosure. In addition, Section 117g previ-
ously did not require the person either instituting or defending an action
in small claims court (either as the plaintiff, defendant, or an employee
or officer appearing for a plaintiff or defendant corporation) to disclose
the fact that he or she is an attorney. Section 117g, as amended by
Chapter 1228, now requires the person instituting an action in small
claims court to disclose, in the claim filed, the fact that he or she is an
attorney and that the defendant, if not an attorney, has the right to make
an ex parte motion, either in person or by mail, requesting that the case
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be transferred to the justice or municipal court with jurisdiction. In ad-
dition, Section 117g has also been amended to require a person defend-
ing an action in small claims court to disclose to the court, in writing
not later than 48 hours before the time scheduled for the hearing, that
he or she is an attorney. Failure to give such notice will bar the party
who is an attorney from defending the action and thus, where the de-
fendant is an attorney and fails to give such notice, the plaintiff will nec-
essarily receive judgment by default since such defendant is precluded
from being represented by another in the action [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 1 17g]. However, where the defendant is a corporation being defended
by an attorney, the corporation is not precluded from obtaining another
officer, employee, or agent to defend the action. Either prior to or at the
hearing, the plaintiff is to be informed by the court that the defendant
is an attorney, and that if the plaintiff is not an attorney but wishes to
be represented by counsel, he or she has the right to request that the
case be transferred to the court with jurisdiction.
Under prior law, if the defendant appealed an adverse decision ren-
dered in small claims court, the plaintiff corporation was required to
then be represented by an attorney [Paradise v. Nowlin, 86 Cal. App.
2d 897, 898, 195 P.2d 867 (1948)]. Section 117j of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Chapter 990, now permits an agent to repre-
sent the plaintiff corporation in superior court should the defendant ap-
peal the decision. Furthermore, Section 117j of the Code of Civil
Procedure previously required any defendant wishing to appeal an ad-
verse decision rendered in small claims court to post bond in the amount
of the judgment rendered, interest on that judgment, and such additional
costs as may be awarded to the plaintiff if the decision is affirmed. In
Brooks v. Small Claims Court [8 CAL. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105
Cal Rptr. 785 (1973)], the court declared that requiring a defendant
to post bond as a condition to the filing of an appeal constituted a
"taking" (even though temporary), in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment [Id. at 667-671, 504 P.2d at 1253-
56, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 789-92]. Section 117j of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been amended by Chapter 266 to delete the provision re-
quiring a bond as a condition to an appeal. In addition, Section 117ha
of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended to provide that en-
forcement of the judgment will be automatically stayed until the time
for filing an appeal has expired, or if an appeal has been filed, until a
decision is rendered by the superior court. These sections, as amended
by Chapter 266, therefore are now in conformity with the court's hold-
ing in Brooks.
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See Generally:
1) Adams, Defendant's Right to Counsel in Small Claims-Real or Fictional? [The
Bond that Backfired], 45 CAL. S.BJ. 226 (1970).
Civil Procedure; declarations under penalty of perjury
Code of Civil Procedure §2015.5 (amended).
SB 724 (Holmdahl); STATS 1975, Ch 666
(Effective January 1, 1977)
Support: State Bar of California
Opposition: Judicial Council
Section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a decla-
ration under penalty of perjury may be utilized in those instances where
a sworn statement would be allowed to support, establish, evidence, or
prove a matter. Previously, however, this section permitted such decla-
rations to be so used only if they were executed pursuant to the law of
California. Section 2015.5 has been amended by Chapter 666 to now
permit the use of declarations under penalty of perjury executed pur-
suant to the law of any state. Thus, this elimination of the previous
limitation on the execution of a declaration under penalty of perjury is
in keeping with reciprocity and the advance in the expeditious handling
of documents [STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESO-
LUTION 11-25].
See Generally:
1) 3 WrrIN, CALIFORNIA PRoCEDURE, Pleading §350 (2d ed. 1971) (declarations
under penalty of perjury).
2) CoNTIuiN EDUCATION OF TH BAR. CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
MOTIONs, Declarations and Affidavits, aid Orders §§31, 34 (1957) (use of decla-
rations under penalty of perjury in place of affidavits).
Civil Procedure; dissolution of marriage
Civil Code §4509 (amended).
AB 460 (Maddy); STATS 1975, Ch 35
Support: State Bar of California
Section 4509 of the Civil Code has been amended by Chapter 35 to
provide that evidence of specific acts of misconduct is improper and in-
admissible in a proceeding for legal separation or dissolution of mar-
riage. Section 4509 previously recognized two instances where specific
acts of misconduct were allowed into evidence: where child custody was
at issue or where the court determined that it was "necessary" to estab-
lish the existence of irreconcilable differences. Section 4509, as
amended by Chapter 35, no longer permits evidence of misconduct to
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establish irreconcilable differences, although such evidence is still per-
mitted where child custody is in issue.
COMMENT
The Family Law Act [CAL. CIV. CODE §4000 et seq.] was designed
to restructure the existing divorce laws and eliminate fault as a standard
for divorce [Report of the 1969 Divorce Reform Legislation, JOURNAL
OF THE ASSEMBLY 8054-63 (1969 Reg. Sess.)]. After its enactment,
irreconcilable differences became the primary ground for dissolution of
the marriage, and a court was precluded by Section 4509 from allowing
specific acts of misconduct into evidence; although, as discussed above,
two exceptions were retained. The exception that allowed introduction
of evidence regarding misconduct to establish irreconcilable differences
was intended to apply only in very narrowly defined circumstances [Id.
at 8059]. However, Section 4509 did not provide any guidelines as to
when such evidence was "necessary," and consequently such determina-
tions were left to the discretion of the trial judge. Liberal interpretation
of this exception resulted in the continuation of the fault standard and
effectively circumvented the stated goals of the Family Law Act [Com-
ment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Di-
vorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1306, 1322 (1970)]. The present
amendment deletes this exception and thus eliminates the primary incon-
sistency between the goals of the Family Law Act and its application,
as the courts may no longer admit evidence of misconduct -to determine
the existence of irreconcilable differences.
See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ATToRNEY's GUIDE TO FAMILY LAw AcT
PRACTICE §§3.23, 3.24 (1972).
2) STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 6-10 (dissolution of
marriage).
Civil Procedure; mentally disordered persons
Welfare and Institutions Code §§4014.5, 5152.1, 5152.2, 5358.6,
5369.1, 5370.1, 5371, 5402, 5404 (new); §§5150, 5303.1, 7325
(amended).
AB 1422 (Lanterman); STATS 1975, Ch 960
Opposition: Department of Finance
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (hereinafter referred to as LPS Act)
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5000 et seq.] provides procedures for the
involuntary commitment to mental health facilities of persons who are
a danger to themselves or others or who are gravely disabled. It also
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provides procedures for the appointment of conservators for such per-
sons. Chapter 960 amends several sections of the LPS Act, changing
both pre- and post-commitment procedures.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 960, Section 5150 provided that
any person who was a danger to himself or others as a result of mental
disorder, or who was gravely disabled, could be placed in a mental
health facility by a peace officer or other designated person upon reason-
able cause [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1593, §368, at 3337]. Chapter 960
has amended Section 5150 of the Welfare-and Institutions Code to re-
quire probable, rather than reasonable, cause before such incarceration
may be made. This change was not intended to alter the actual stand-
ard, but rather was intended only to change the language of the section
to replace the more ambiguous term "reasonable cause" with the more
familiar term "probable cause." In addition, the requirement that the
peace officer or other specified person make his or her decision to detain
the disturbed person on the basis of personal observation has been de-
leted from Section 5150. These changes were made after publication
of the results of a widely distributed professional questionnaire, in which
80.7 percent of the law enforcement officials and mental health profes-
sionals agreed that peace officers should be allowed to apply the stand-
ards of probable cause in determining whether or not to take a person
to a 72-hour evaluation facility pursuant to Section 5150 [Mentally Dis-
ordered Criminal Offender Professional Questionnaire, Prepared by the
Assembly Select Committee on Mentally Disordered Criminal Offenders,
Hon. Frank Lanterman, Chairman, February, 1974 (questionnaire and
responses) (hereinafter cited as Questionnaire) (on file at the Pacific
Laiw' Journal)]. If the probable cause for detention is based on the state-
ments of another person, this person may be liable in a civil action if
he or she intentionally gives a statement which he or she knows to be
false (§5150).
Section 5301 delineates procedures for the detention of an imminently
dangerous person for an -additional 90-day period after a 14-day period
of intensive treatment. The professional person in charge of the facility
who is responsible for the disturbed person must petition the court to
extend the commitment period of the, disturbed person, and a hearing
or jury trial must be conducted on this petition. Chapter 960 has
amended Section 5303.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to provide
that the court may appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist with forensic
skills to examine the disturbed person prior to any hearing or jury trial
on the petition for 90 days' additional inpatient treatment. If such a
psychiatrist or psychologist is appointed, he or she is required to testify
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at the hearing or trial on the petition, and neither the professional person
who petitioned for the additional inpatient treatment nor the physicians
who provided the intensive treatment are required to be present at the
hearing or trial on the petition unless subpoenaed by the person who
is the subject of the hearing or trial. The use of these post-certification
procedures has been rare, with only 18 petitions for additional treatment
having been filed in the 1972-73 fiscal year, while petitions could have
been filed to commit 6,247 people [Letter from William Mayer, M.D.,
Director of Health, to Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, June 7, 1974,
on file in Assemblyman Lanterman's office]. Apparently, petitioning
psychiatrists were reluctant to go to court to testify on such petitions
[Questionnaire, supra, question 6, at 7], and it would appear that this
change to Section 5303.1 will encourage greater use of post-certification
procedures by allowing the filing of a petition without the necessity of
a court appearance, while ensuring that an examining psychiatrist or
psychologist who has personally examined the disturbed person is pres-
ent at the hearing or trial.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5358 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, an LPS conservator may, by court order, be given the right
to place his or her conservatee in an inpatient facility for treatment.
Section 5358.6 has been added by Chapter 960 to provide that any con-
servator who has this right may also require the conservatee to undergo
outpatient treatment.
Section 5365, which provides that a potential conservatee shall have
the public defender or other counsel appointed to represent him or her
in proceedings to establish an LPS Act conservatorship, has been inter-
preted by the California Attorney General to apply only to public con-
servatorships such that this right to be appointed counsel under Section
5365 does not extend to a proposed private conservator [52 Ops. ATT'Y
GEN. 260 (1969)]. Chapter 960 has therefore added Section 5370.1
to the Welfare and Institutions Code to now provide that the court may,
at its discretion, appoint the county counsel or a private attorney to rep-
resent a private conservator in all proceedings connected with a conserv-
atorship if he or she is unable to afford the services of counsel.
See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CAL FORNA CONSERVATORSHIPS §§8.1-8.63
(Supp. 1974).
Civil Procedure; contempt of court-sentence
Code of Civil Procedure § § 128, 1209 (amended).
AB 1170 (Berman); STATS 1975, Ch 836
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Support: State Bar of California; American Civil Liberties Union
Opposition: California District Attorneys' Association; California
Peace Officers' Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 836, an attorney found in contempt
of court, based upon conduct committed in the presence of the court,
could be summarily sentenced and required to serve a sentence or pay
a fine before he or she could challenge the validity of the contempt order
[CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1211]. The justification for this procedure
had been determined to lie with the trial courts' "inherent statutory
power to exercise reasonable control over the orderly administration of
justice and to maintain the dignity and authority of the court" [People
v. Fusaro, 18 Cal. App. 3d 877, 887-88, 96 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374
(1971)]. Code of Civil Procedure Sections 128 and 1209, as amended
by Chapter 836, now provide that where an attorney, an attorney's in-
vestigator or agent, or someone acting under an attorney's direction is
cited for contempt in the preparation or conduct of any criminal or civil
action, the sentence is to be stayed for a period of three judicial days
within which time a petition for extraordinary relief testing the lawful-
ness of the court's order may be filed. Once the petition for extraordi-
nary relief has been filed, it is then within the discretion of the reviewing
court whether or not to further stay the execution of the contempt sen-
tence [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1072; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1507]. Finally,
this section does not stay the sentence when the conduct forming the
basis of the contempt order is disrespect toward the court or its judicial
officers [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6068].
See Generally:
1) 4 WrrmN, CALUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§138, 152 (2nd ed. 1970) (contempt
during trial).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL WRITS, Drafting Petition
§§10.42-10.47, 17.12 (1970) (major use of certiorari: review of contempt proceed-
ings).
3) Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion that Due Process Re-
quires Notice and Hearing Before An Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REV.
463 (1966).
Civil Procedure;. filing fees on appeal
Government Cade § 68926 (amended).
SB 614 (Song); STATS 1975, Ch 986
An appeal from a decision rendered in a civil proceeding may be in-
stituted by the filing of a notice of appeal with the clerk of the superior
court [CAL. COURT RULES, Rule 1]. Although Section 68926 of the
Government Code requires a $50 filing fee as a prerequisite to such an
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
Civil Procedure
appeal, the fee did not previously have to be paid until the record (to
be considered on appeal) had been filed. Since this initial step for insti-
tuting an appeal did not previously require any financial commitment,
an appellant was not deterred from filing a notice of appeal even though
he or she had no intention of completing the appeal; and such filing
resulted in the depletion of the courts' already limited resources [NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE CALIFORNIA COURTS OF AP-
PEAL 40 (1974)]. Section 68926, as amended by Chapter 986, now
requires that the $50 filing fee be paid at the time notice of the appeal
is filed, apparently to discourage frivolous and unnecessary appeals; and,
at the very least, to cover the initial cost of instituting an appeal.
Filing fees as a prerequisite to an appeal, however, may be waived
since the California Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Keays [4 Cal. 3d
649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971)] extended in forma pau-
peris relief to the appellate level on the basis of the court's inherent
power to formulate rules not inconsistent with existing statutes [Id. at
656, 484 P.2d at 74, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 402]. In addition, the court
observed that until the Judicial Council or Legislature address this area,
the individual courts could continue to formulate their own standards
for granting in forma pauperis relief [Id.]. Therefore, Section 68926
has been further amended by Chapter 986 to expressly authorize the
Judicial Council to adopt rules to govern the time and method of paying
the required filing fees as well as to establish standards for excusing an
appellant from payment of such fees.
See Generally:
1) 6 W1TK, CALIFORNIA PROCEnIJR, Appeal §408 (2d ed. 1971) (transmission of
record to reviewing court).
2) California Supreme Court: Civil Procedure, 60 CAL. L. Rnv. 785 (1972).
3) Note, California's Civil Appeal in Forma Pauperis-An Inherent Power of the
Courts, 23 HAST. UJ. 683 (1972).
Civil Procedure; physician-patient privilege
Evidence Code §999 (amended).
AB 73 (McAlister); STATS 1975, Ch 318
Support: California Law Revision Commission; State Bar of Califor-
nia; California Trial Lawyers Association
The physician-patient privilege permits a patient, whether or not a
party to a given proceeding, to prevent the disclosure of any confidential
communication between such patient and the physician [CAL. Evi-
DENCE CODE §994]. One narrow exception to the privilege was for-
merly recognized by Evidence Code Section 999, which provided that
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such confidential communications could be admitted into evidence in a
proceeding to recover damages arising out of the "criminal conduct" of a
patient who was not necessarily a party to the suit. Chapter 318 has
amended Section 999 to eliminate the "criminal conduct exception" and
replace it with a "general exception" which allows disclosure of physi-
cian-patient communications to be made in any proceeding to recover
compensation for damages resulting from the conduct of the patient,
whether or not a party to the proceeding, upon a showing of good cause.
COMMENT
The "criminal conduct exception" previously recognized by Section
999 of the Evidence Code had been the target of severe criticism. In
Fontes v. Superior Court [28 Cal. App. 3d 589, 104 Cal. Rptr. 845
(1972)], the court noted that the exception could result in the invasion
of a patient's privacy in litigation not initiated by or on behalf of the
patient, as well as in gaining extortionate settlements made to avoid em-
barrassing disclosures [Id. at 595, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 848]. In view of
the potential for abuse, the court called for re-evaluation of the excep-
tion [d.]. In response to the court's suggestion in Fontes, a study was
conducted by the California Law Revision Commission to evaluate the
"criminal conduct exception". The Commission found the exception to
be burdensome, difficult to administer, and ill-designed to make needed
evidence available, and therefore recommended that it be repealed [Rec-
ommendation Relating to Evidence Code Section 999-The "Criminal
Conduct" Exception to the Physician-Patient Privilege, 11 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1147-
62(1973)].
The "general exception" now contained in Section 999 allows disclo-
sure of communications between a physician and a patient only where
good cause is shown and the disclosure involves the condition of a pa-
tient as it relates to his or her conduct. This exception "permits disclo-
sure not only in a case where the patient is a party to the action but
also in a case where a party's liability is based on the conduct of the
patient" [JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, 1352-53 (1975-76
Reg. Sess.)]. Therefore, such requirements are intended to protect the
patient, whether or not a party to the proceeding, from general inquiries
into his or her medical records [Id.].
See Generally:
1) Recommendation Relating to the Good Cause Exception to the Physician-Patient
Privilege, 12 CAL. LAw REvISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUmis 602-608 (1974).
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Civil Procedure; notice of trial
Code of Civil Procedure §594 (amended).
SB 847 (Holmdahl); STATS 1975, Ch 1001
Section 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a party instituting
an action in superior or municipal court to proceed with his or her case
and receive an appropriate court decision (including, inter alia, dismis-
sal of the action, verdict, and judgment) where an adverse party, served
with notice, fails to appear. If the issue before the court is one of fact,
however, such party must additionally introduce sufficient proof that the
adverse party was served with notice in order to proceed with the case.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1001, Section 594 only required that
the adverse party receive notice five days prior to the date of trial. This
section, however, did not expressly indicate how notice was to be served
or how proof of service was to be established. Chapter 1001 has
amended Section 594 to require that the clerk serve, by mail, all adverse
parties with notice at least 20 days prior to the date set for trial. If,
however, the clerk fails to mail such notice, the party instituting the ac-
tion is then permitted to mail a copy of the notice to the adverse parties
at least 15 days prior to the date set for trial. Section 594 has been
further amended to provide that proof of service may be established by
a clerk's certificate if notice is served by the clerk [CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. §1013a(3)] or by an affidavit or certificate if service is made
by the person instituting the action [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1013a( 1),
(2)].
See Generally:
1) 3 WrriN, C AEomm, PRocroun, Pleading §833 (2d ed. 1971) (failure to appear
at trial).
2) 4 WMrIN, CALFomIr PROCEDURE, Proceedings Without Trial §118; Trial §50
(2nd ed. 1971) (failure to appear and notice of trial).
Civil Procedure; electronic court reporting
Government Code §72194.5 (new).
SB 629 (Song); STATS 1975, Ch 665
Support: Judicial Council
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 665, a record of the proceedings
in justice or municipal court had to be made by an official court re-
porter. Studies conducted in this area, however, have indicated that
the installation of electronic equipment would reduce court costs and in-
crease the accuracy of court transcripts [McGEoRGE SCHOOL OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC, COURT REPORTING STUDY, FEASIBILITY
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EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATE METHODS OF PREPARING COURT TRAN-
SCRIPTS, 57, 62 (1973)]. Section 72194.5 has been added to the
Government Code by Chapter 665 to expressly authorize the use of elec-
tronic recording equipment in a civil action or misdemeanor criminal
proceeding in justice or municipal courts when a court reporter is not
available. The legislature has determined that the use of such recording
equipment is to supplement the record-keeping process presently in use
by providing an alternate method of recording the proceeding when it
is impractical to have an official court reporter continually available
[CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 665, §2, at 1. The legislature has further sug-
gested that such recording equipment be used in (1) misdemeanor crim-
inal proceedings in which guilty pleas are taken or rights have been
waived, (2) misdemeanor trials where official reporters are not presently
in use, and (3) civil trials where a settled statement may be required
[Id.].
See Generally:
1) H. SHORT & ASSOCIATES & MCGEORGE SCHOOL op LAW, VIDEOTAPE RECORDINO IN
THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1975).
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